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Neuborne: First Amendment

CONFLICTING CLAIMS TO

FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Burt Neubome*

Honorable George C. Pratt:
Our next speaker, Burt Neuborne, of NYU Law School, is not
only a law professor, constitutional scholar, and one of the leading
scholars particularly in the area of the First Amendment, but as life
goes on, his career broadens. He is now a television commentator
frequently and even a movie star. He is in, I guess, every media
there is known to man and women. Burt, you have the next halfhour, plus.
ProfessorBurt Neubome:
Thank you, thank you. I had not planned to speak about my movie
career, but given the slightest opening, I will. You wAil note that
one of the cases that I may talk about is the Hustler case, which I
became deeply interested in only after I got the part in People v.
Lany Fynt.2 I asked them, "How did you come to ask me to play
this role?" The two writers told me they were blocked one night
writing the script and decided to have a couple of beers. They
turned on the television and I was doing some "talking head"
somewhere. They said, "That is Jerry Falwell's lawyer. That is
the guy that is going to play Jerry Falwell's lawyer," which I
thought was terrific, until I got the shooting script that said

"Falwell's pompous and obnoxious lawyer approaches"-so much
for my TV persona.
As veterans of past meetings recall, what I try to do during this
slot is a summary of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. We are usually hard pressed to fit the cases into the
* John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law and Legal Director of the Brenaan
Center
for Justice at New York University.
1

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1987).

2PEOPLEV. LARRY FLYNr (Columbia TriStar 1996).
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time allotted. This is a strange term, and for all I know there may
be something significant in this. But in the past term, unlike the
last five or ten years where fully ten percent of the court's docket
was taken up with important First Amendment cases, usually nine
or ten for us to talk about-and this is on a docket that's shrinking
all the time--for the first time this past term, there are only two
First Amendment cases that are really significant. And only one of
them, I think, is important to document. Since nature abhors a
vacuum, that means I will get a chance to give a little retrospective
look at the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, and
the predictions about some of the important issues that are likely to
come up in the near future. One of the issues may be campaign
finance reform, which is on the docket, and there are two certiorari
positions on the docket for Friday's conference that are quite
significant in that area and we will see where it occurs.
The first case is Arkansas Educational Television Network v.
Forbes.' This is an important sort of combined First Amendment,
equal protection, democracy, and journalism case. The case is
relatively simple, but very important. Public television in Arkansas
decides to sponsor a debate between the candidates, and they just
automatically invite the Republican and Democratic candidates.4 It
is a congressional election. One of the third party candidates says,
"Wait a minute. I'm on the ballot too and I may not win, but I
managed to satisfy the relatively onerous requirements of getting on
the ballot by petition in Arkansas to run for Congress.5 You cannot
hold one of these debates without including all of the candidates
because that would be a viewpoint choice by government.' Because
it is a public television station, a government funded television
station, the government would be making a choice to favor the two
established parties, the two major parties, the Republicans and
Democrats, at the expense of this third party candidate who had
7
gotten on the ballot."
' 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
4Id. at 1637.
5 Id. at 1638.
61d.
7 Id.

at 1640.
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The Arkansas television people said, "We want to put on a debate

that will force the two candidates who have a chance to win to clash
with one another and really have a serious discussion of issues. 8 If
we put on everybody who is running, what we will get is a kind of

cacophony. 9 We have a finite amount of time and we are making a
journalistic decision, just like we would make a journalistic decision
as to what would go into a newspaper.10 We are making a
journalistic decision that this is the debate that really ought to go on
only between the two major candidates.'" To invite everybody is to
in effect weaken the news value, the educational value that we think
the program has."12

You can see that in this First Amendment case, unlike the usual
First Amendment cases, you do not know who is wearing the First
Amendment white hat. You do not know who the good guy is in
this case, who can trot out the First Amendment as the club to beat
the other people in the case. When it is a Hyde Park speaker and a
policeman shutting down the speaker, then you know who is the
speaker. You know who is supposed to get the First Amendment
protection. But in the case like Arkansas Television, you've got a
multiplicity of people, all of whom can claim legitimately that they
have a significant First Amendment interest.' 3 The Arkansas
Television Station is putting on the program. We are used to
thinking of journalists as having very important First Amendment
interests. You think about the newspaper cases and you cannot
interfere with the editorial discretion of a journalist about what goes
in the paper. The educational TV people say, "We are publicly
funded, but we are journalists and perform the same kind of
function. We should be entitled to the same First Amendment
insulation about our decisions as the media." The two major party
candidates say, "We have important First Amendment interests in
having a serious debate with each other because we are the two
people who will likely win and we want to inform the electorate so
8

d.

9Id. at 1643.
1'Id.
" Id. at 1638.
12id.

13 118 S. (t 1633 (1998).
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they can cast the best possible vote. And, of course, you've got the
minority party candidate, the third party candidate who says, "This
is ridiculous. Everybody is talking about the First Amendment
candidate. It is my voice that ought to be injected into the political
process so we have a reasonable chance of electing wrestlers as
governors of states." So, it is the voice of the third party trying to
enter the process, saying we are the First Amendment champions,
riding the white horse and waving the First Amendment.
Finally, there is the audience, the people out there who need the
information. What benefits them most in a case like this? What
you have is a model of an emerging, more complex First
Amendment world in which more than one person has a legitimate
claim as to whom the First Amendment applies. This case parallels
the case during the Presidential election when Ross Perot was
excluded from the debate between Bush and Clinton. There you
did not have a state action hook. The notion of whether the First
Amendment is involved with a privately sponsored debate made it
very difficult to litigate that case. This is that same issue in the
context of a publicly sponsored debate.
The Eighth Circuit"4 held that in choosing to create the debate, the
public television station had created a public forum and that it could
not exclude from the public forum on the basis of content, on the
basis of the identity and the nature of the speaker."5 The court held
that creating a public debate on television is like building a park."'
You cannot say who can come into that park and speak and who
cannot.'7 The Eighth Circuit then required that all candidates who
are certified and on the ballot must be a participant in any publicly
sponsored debate, and the Supreme Court reviewed that decision."
The position of the candidate, which is the Eighth Circuit position,
was that the real voice we are worried about is the outsider. 9 This
minority party candidate is basically being discriminated against
14

Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Network, 93 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
5
Id. at 503.
16 Id.
17

Id.

" Id.at 504. See Arkansas Television, 118 S. Ct. 1633.
19 Id.
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because he is not a Republican or a Democrat; but he is a candidate
and he has satisfied the requirements of the State of Arkansas to get
on the ballot.' You cannot treat candidates differently. 2' All
candidates have to be treated the same.?
The educational television position was that the journalists have
3 This is essentially a news
complete First Amendment discretion?2
judgment about how to structure a news event. As such, the news
judgment has to be deferred to and you have to trust the journalists,
even though they are government paid journalists, to do the right
thing and to try to structure this so that the best information comes
out.

As usual, of course, there was no organized brief on behalf of the
audience. Very few people speak for the audience in American
First Amendment law. Then there was an intermediate brief that
we submitted from the Brennan Center at NYU,2' which is a new
center that has been set up to honor Justice Brennan and which
attempts to make itself heard on issues of democracy. We said both
the AETC position and the journalists' positions are wrong.' Both
extreme positions are wrong.'
You do not have to have
everybody, and you do not have to delegate total discretion to the
journalist? What you should try to do is find an intermediate
position that says this is not exactly like a private setting so that the
journalists do not have complete discretion, but they do have
limited discretion to set up the debate.' However, they must do so
in a way that will maximize its educational and news value to the
public.'
Our suggestion was that there should also be firm
regulations in effect before the event that will govern the exercise of
2 Id.
21 id.

22 Id. at504.
2 Id.

See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of
Law in support of Respondent, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 93
F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 96-779).
25 Id. at 11-14.
2
6 Id. at 20-22.
27 id.
2 Id.
2 id.
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that discretion, so that the discretion is not ad hoc discretion that
could be simply hidden discrimination in favor of a particular
candidate. 3°
Well, the Court bought half of our position. 3' It bought that this
was indeed a mixed setting in which the First Amendment rights of
the journalists and the First Amendment rights of the excluded
candidate had to be in some way balanced so that you do not go to
an extreme where one's rights obliterate the other.32
What the Court said was that presumptively the journalists can
invite whomever they want, but the one thing they cannot do is
discriminate on the basis of content. 3 In other words, the
journalists cannot say, "I'll take this candidate and this candidate,
but this candidate I'm not going to have on the basis of content."
This is the first time I have ever seen the court do one of these
hybrid First Amendment situations where they recognized that this
is a journalism decision, but they also recognized that there are
important values at stake for other players in the system and they
4
try to work out a general plan that deals with both.
The dissent in the case accepted the notion that there ought to be
formal hard rules in effect on how this discretion gets exercised as a
condition of the journalists having this type of discretion.3s The
majority said they did not think that was necessary.' So, the basic
norm that comes out is that on future educational television debates,
educational television can make a judgment about who comes on.
It does not have to put all the candidates on, as long as it is not
excluding candidates on the basis of content.38
Now, those of you who are practicing lawyers will know that this
is a bonanza for you. This is another one in a long history of
Supreme Court decisions where the rightness or wrongness of a
3 id.
3'Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Network, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
321d.

33Id. at 1641.
34Id.
35

Id. at 1643-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1639.
37Id. at 1640.
36

38

Id. at 1639.
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decision turns on motive. Is the motive really hostility to the
content or is there some other legitimate non-content basis for the
justification, for the exclusion, that is just a prescription for
litigation? My sense is that what will happen in the future in these
cases, especially without any hard rules in effect as to discretion, is
that these exclusions will be challenged on the basis of the pretextthat the real reason that the person was kept off the ballot was the
hostility in content. We have not seen the end of these cases by any
means.

I should say that the phantom issue that was hovering behind this
case, and what had at least some members of the Court very
concerned, was public financing of elections. As you may know
from reading the papers now, four states have gone to full public
financing. We have full public financing now in Maine, Vermont,
Massachusetts, and Arizona has just adopted by referendum.Y9 One
of the hard issues as the country confronts the notion of whether it
wishes to subsidize the process is going to be how to allocate the
money; who gets what? Does every candidate get the same
amount, no matter what their level of support or do you tilt toward
the more established candidates? Is that not unfair? Doesn't that
just perpetuate the status quo? There will be very hard questions
about how to allocate this money.
And I think what the court may have been doing in Arkansas
Television is leaving the broadest opening for thinking about this
without closing this down, because if the ACLU had been accepted
in Arkansas Television, the principle would have continued over to
the funding of elections. And all candidates would have essentially
had to have been treated the same way, and there is some concern
that this would have meant the end of serious public financing. On
the other hand, if they had said total discretion, if they bought the
journalists' position, then the concern would be that if we ever do
go to a public financing position that gives the government - the
"' Paul Carrier, Big Hurdles Still Ahead for Campaign Finance Reforms,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,

Nov. 7, 1996, at 10A; Timothy J. Connolly, Mhite's

Cause: Clean Elections Law, SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Feb. 14, 1999, at Bi;
Phoenix, State Gets Federal OK for 2 Propositions, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC,
Feb. 18, 1999, at Bi; Bob Hohler, Election Finance Targeted in Equality Fight
Big Money Seen as InsidiousForce,TIM BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1997, at Al.
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powers that be - much too much discretion in the allocation of this
money. I think what the Court may have been doing is setting up a
shadow, a regime for dealing with the next issue down the pike, but
of course that is just speculation.
The second interesting case to come before the court -HonorableGeorge C. Pratt:
Can I ask you just one question?
ProfessorNeuborne:
Sure.
Honorable George Pratt:
Is news value a permissible consideration?
ProfessorNeuborne:
Yes.
HonorableGeorge C. Pratt:
Isn't news value based on content?
ProfessorNeuborne:
The criteria are so soft, I know. The Court avoided actually
coming down with the laundry list of particular criteria, but I think
they would have said educational value of the performer instead of
news value. I am not sure what that means -- that is why we were

so insistent that there be written guidelines in effect so there would
be a full public discussion as to what the criteria might be or should
be before it went in. I am very skeptical about the practicality of
what emerges from the Supreme Court in Arkansas Television.10
40 118 S. Ct 1633 (1998).
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They tell you that you are not supposed to use content but then by
not requiring hard rules be in effect in advance and by accepting the
notion of soft criteria like this, they virtually invite content based
judgments that are hidden - that are described in non-content based
terms. That is why I predict that many will be litigating these
issues because they are very litigatable at this point.
The second issue, the second important case in the Supreme
Court, National Endowmentfor the Arts v. Finley," turned out to be
not a very important practical one. I thought it would be very
important, but on a practical level it turned out to be less important.
This case deals with, again, something that is going to be
increasingly important in the next century in terms of free speech
law-government decisions to subsidize certain kinds of speech.2
And I suggested to you that the Arkansas Television case is a
subsidy case deep down because these are public funds being used
to create a platform for private people to speak on. 0 And it is a
free platform, so there is a subsidy there.A And the question is how
do we deal with the constitutional rules governing subsidized
speech. I am going to come back and talk about that in a second
because I think that may be the most important issue that is coming
out of these cases.
The National Endowments for the Arts case involves a program
that was put into effect many years ago to create the National
Endowment, as a way of funneling money to the artistic community
in an effort to foster the broadest possible and richest diversity of
artistic expression in the United States. ' It was really an effort to
say the wealthy do not decide what artist is worthy. There will be
public money to support the arts instead of the old usual rule that a
few rich families set the taste for everybody else by establishing the
art market and deciding what is successful and what is not in the
artistic world. This was a really marvelous effort to break away
from that and to say there will be a broad diversity of art available
41 118

S. CL 2168 (1998).

42Id.

43 Arkansas Tdevion, 118 S. CL at 1639.

44Id.
4Finey, 118 S. Ct. at 2171.
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because the public will subsidize it. And it has been generally
conceived to be a very successful, wonderful program. But, of
course, one of the criteria of the program has to be excellence.
You are not going subsidize garbage. You do not want to subsidize
bad art; you want to subsidize good art, so that immediately puts
the government into the business of deciding what good art and bad
art is. With all of the difficult definitional problems about what
excellence means, over the years the temptation to add more
criteria became uncontrollable because if the government is
providing the money then politicians worry about how it is being
spent. When one of the leading performance artists in the United
States likes to take off all her clothes and bathe herself in chocolate
on a stage, the question emerges in certain portions of the United
States whether the government should pay for it.' That is what
precipitated this issue. I mean, one of Karen Finley's major
performances is to get naked and roll around in chocolate and the
question is who should pay for it?'7
I, myself, am willing to pay very substantial amounts for it. So
Congress imposed an additional criteria on top of excellence. 4 And
the additional criteria were that it could not be indecent. 49 You
could not fund indecent art, and you could not fund art that failed to
respect the values of the people.-' Two criteria that I am sure we in
this room can immediately know exactly what they mean. You do
not fund indecent art, and you do not fund art that does not respect
the values of the people.
4Id.

47 Id.
4' Id. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 954(c)(1)-(10) which provides for "grants in aid" or
"loans" for arts projects and programs proposed by individuals or groups of
"exceptional talent" who are "traditionally underrepresented recipients of
financial assistance," to be funded through the National Endowment for the Arts.
Id.
49 See id.
'0 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1). Section 954(d)(1) provides that in choosing recipients
of grants for the arts, the Chairperson of the National Endowment of the Arts
shall ensure that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American pubic .... ." Id.
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There was an uproar in the art community over that and Congress
backed away in the statute. They backed away and modified the
statute to say that these are not obligatory criteria, these are
predatory criteria the Endowment should keep in mind while it's
giving out the funds.51 Of course, its final judgment on excellence
is the real criteria that will govern.5 That is the way the statute
reads. The statute reads in this rather bizarre way. They lay out
the criteria of indecency and fidelity to the Nation's values, but just
say that these are things you should keep in mind.' They are not
binding. That was challenged. The criteria were challenged on the
grounds that, "Yes, this is a subsidy, but there are limits on the
extent to which the government can control the allocation, even of
subsidized money. " - It is the government's money, yes, but even
the government's money is bounded in some sense by the First
Amendment.
Arkansas Television is consistent with that, because to the extent it
places First Amendment constraints on what the network can do,it is essentially saying this is the subsidy. However, it is a subsidy
that has to be allocated in accordance with First Amendment
constraints.? It can not be allocated pursuant to content-based
judgments.
The National Endowment for the Arts case is again a powerful
reaffirmation of the notion that subsidized speech has some
restrictions attached to it.- But what the Court did is pull the teeth
of the program by saying, "Well, if you said it was predatory then
it's predatory.59 Then we are going to say it is predatory, and
therefore we are not dealing with hard and fast criteria.' And since
we are not dealing with hard and fast criteria, we do not see how
511d.
52Id.
53id.

54 National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2179 (1998).
'5 Arkansas Edue. Television Network v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1989).
6

id.

5 Id.

5Finey, 118 S. Ct. at 2175.
59 d. at 2176.
60
id.
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into the First

So they sustained as a matter of facial

jurisprudence the existence of the statute.62 Whether or not there
will be as applied challenge, I do not know at this point. The Court
sustained as a matter of facial jurisprudence since it is the
government's money. '3 The government has very substantial
control over how it spends in terms of what kind of speech it wishes
to foster and what kind of speech it does not wish to foster.' As
long as they were dealing with a relatively minor predatory statute
they did not have to go to the mat and make final judgments on the
levels of subsidized speech.'
The National Endowment of the Arts case really does not advance
the analysis on subsidized speech. It leaves us where we were
before. I want to quickly review because I think the government's
role in subsidizing is so enormous that it subsidizes across the
board. I am in the middle of challenging the restrictions on the
legal service community. That case is still pending in the Second
Circuit and challenges the governments position that, "Hey, it's
our money, we can tell the legal services lawyer what to do with
it." My argument is that there are limits even on what the
government can subsidize. That you cannot put content-based
restrictions on, you cannot put different types of restrictions on.
That is still pending in the Second Circuit.'
There are two leading Supreme Court cases that you ought to keep
in mind, because they are the two polar cases that tell you how
subsidized speeches are going to be treated in the future: Rust v.
Sullivan,' which is the case dealing with subsidized prenatal health
programs and what doctors could say in those subsidized prenatal

61Id.
62

M. at 2177.

63Id. .
64Id..
6'Id.

at 2179.
6 Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 98-6006, 1999 WL 5300 (2d Cir.
January 7,1999).
6 id.
6 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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health programs;6 and Rosenberger v. The University of Wrginia,"O
which is a case involving allocations for subsidies for student
newspapers at the state institution at the University of Virginia.7'
In Rust v. Sullivan, as I am sure many of you know, Congress
imposed a set of restrictions on doctors working for these federally
funded prenatal care clinics. 2 And what they said was that the
doctors who work for the clinics cannot discuss abortion with their
patients, even if they think abortion is a preferred medical option. 3
They can give information to the patients about where they can get
additional information, but they can not themselves mention the
word abortion or talk about it.14 And nobody on the premises can.Y
So if you accept the federal subsidy, the argument was, you have to
promise not to talk about abortion.76
That was challenged in the Supreme Court as an obvious violation
of the free speech rights of the doctors, the interference with their
ability to practice medicine and interference with the ability for the
patients to receive information that they need.Y' A classic, straight
out First Amendment argument. The Supreme Court upheld the
prohibition.- The Chief Justice writing for the Court upheld the
prohibition, essentially saying this is a government program.n The
government has decided to fund a program about prenatal care, but
not to fund a program about abortion and conceptually the speaker
here is the government. The doctor is just a mouthpiece for the
government. The government can say to the doctor, "you say what
we tell you to say, we're hiring you, essentially, as a microphone
for our speech." The government wants to talk about things other
than abortion, and you cannot on government time, using
'9 Id.
at 178.
70 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
71
1d.
72 500 U.S. at 178. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6.
73 Id.
74
Id.'at 179.
7 id.
76
7

Id.at 180.

1 d.at 192.

7 Id. at 194.
79 Id.
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government resources, go beyond what the government wants to
say. g

Now, that is dramatic. If the rule on subsidized speech is that
whenever the government subsidizes the speaker then the
government gets to call the tune, then the subsidized speech is
essentially immune from free speech restrictions.
You may remember in Rust v. Sullivan, a five-four decision
where Justice Souter was the fifth vote,8' there was a good deal of
speculation that he would not continue to be a reliable fifth vote for
that type of rule, but nobody knew what was going to happen.
Subsidized cases and, for example, the legal services restrictions
were analyzed initially exclusively under Rust v. Sullivan' because
if you can tell doctors what to say in Rust, of course, you can tell
lawyers what to say in the legal services cases. That was a very
quick analogy most judges made, and it was impossible to make
any headway with the case. Then along comes Rosenberger v.
The University of Virginia,3 which is the second case and very
important in the line.
In Rosenberger, the University decided it would fund student
newspapers with government funds, taxpayer funds." But, it was
afraid of violating the Establishment Clause. The University of
Virginia is Jefferson's creation and the Establishment Clause was
one of Jefferson's great hopes and aspirations." So they decided it
would not be faithful to Jefferson's memory to use taxpayer funds
to fund religious newspapers.8"
So what they said to the student body was "secular newspapers
would get funded, but newspapers put out by religious groups
cannot. "u They have to get their own funding somewhere else.
'0 Id. at 179-81.
8"Id. at 176.
2 See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 98-6006, 1999 WL 5300 (2d Cir.
January 7, 1999).
'3 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
4Id. at 823.
5 Id.
8
6Id.at 873-74.
Id. at 824-25.
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That was challenged by the religious newspapers and taken to the
Supreme Court.8
Justice Kennedy in Rosenberger wrote a very interesting decision
distinguishing this case from Rust.' It said that in Rust, the
government was attempting to be the speaker, whereas here the
government is attempting to empower private people to speak.10 It
is trying to empower other people to speak. When the government
subsidy is an empowerment subsidy, not a speaking subsidy, the
empowerment subsidy becomes subject to First Amendment
constraints.

91

He said you cannot discriminate between and among religious and
non-religious newspapers without making an improper content
based discrimination n Exactly what they said you could not do in
Arkansas Television.Y It is the content based discrimination that
they are worried about. And, therefore, they said, even on
subsidized funds, there is a restriction now, a First Amendment
restriction on the way government subsidized funds go."
As long as you can meet a threshold showing that what the
government is attempting to do is empower private people to speak
and not empower itself to speak as a speaker, then it is
permissible.95 Now that is not always going to be crystal clear.
And I suspect sometimes the extent to which the academy has
infiltrated the Supreme Court. These are things that I expect my
colleagues to come out with, not nine people who have an idea of
how the world works. But, it is a highly opinionated, highly
academic, highly conceptual notion of who the speaker is. And it
comes back to what I started with, increasingly now the Court
seems to be engaged in a First Amendment treasure hunt. The First
Amendment treasure hunt is finding the person who is the speaker,
SId. at828.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
Id at 834.
92
I at 835.
91

' Arkansas Edue. Television Network v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1643
(1998).
94 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837.
95IL at 834.
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the person who is entitled to be treated as the beneficiary of the
First Amendment.
So in Rust v. Sullivan, it is the government who is the speaker."
In Rosenberger, it is the religious newspapers." In Arkansas
Television you tell me who they finally decided was the real
beneficiary.'
I think they could not decide who the First
Amendment speaker was in that case so they compromised and
came up with a hybrid that attempted to deal with the interests of
both.99
Now, in the couple of minutes that I have left, let me suggest to
you that that process is also going on in a related area. And by the
way, think about the consequences of a process, of the subsidy
process for the legal service litigation. In the legal services
litigation who is the speaker in the legal services case? Is the
government the speaker or are they empowering the private groups
to engage in legal analysis? Start off the argument by saying this is
obviously an effort to empower private groups. The government
stands up and says, this is obviously the government speaking
through a government program. Then we both sit down having
done our job as advocates and we leave it to the judge to decide
who it is.
However, it is happening in one other area as well. The other
important area is this notion of recognizing that the speech universe
is immensely complex. What should it look like? It is happening
in government-media regulation cases in the last couple of years as
well.
Let me describe two cases just as an example. The first one is
Turner Broadcastingv. FCC [hereinafter "Turner 1"]. 100 Turner I,
as many of you know is a decision involving a congressional statute
requiring cable television broadcasters to carry over-the-air signals
for all over-the-air area broadcasters in their general area.'0 1 The
" Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
97

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819.

9'Arkansas, 118 S.Ct. 1633.
99 Id. at 1643.

100512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter "Turner P].

'0' Id. at 630; 47 U.S.C. §§ 534(b)(1)(B), (h)(1)(A), §§ 4, 5 (Supp. IV 1998). §
4 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
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congressional fear was that there is a natural rivalry between cable
and over-the-air; over-the-air is free, cable charges money.10- If
cable could put over-the-air broadcasters out of business, it would
lose the only real competition that it has and would therefore be
able to raise its rates. 0 So, there is a natural antipathy between the
cable industry and the over-the-air broadcasting industry. That
might cause the cable industry to attempt to pick off and destroy
weak over-the-air broadcasters by not putting them on their network
and thereby making their audience smaller and slowly but surely,
strangling the over the air industry."0 4 By picking off the weakest
and then the next weakest and then the next weakest to the point
where cable would then dominate. That is the story of over-the-air
broadcasters in Congress.10 Cable said, that is crazy, what are we
going to do, take off popular signals for competitive advantage?
The only signals we take off are signals no one wants to see, so
what is the big deal?104
But, over-the-air broadcasters said as a prophylactic matter to
avoid the temptation to try to pick off the weak stations in the overthe-air industry, the cable broadcaster must carry every over-the-air
signal."°'

And the cable broadcasters went into court and said,

"That is ridiculous-you cannot tell us what to put on our television
channels.'""° This is, of course, the same argument that the
Arkansas Television stations had made, "We are journalists. We
get to decide what goes on our media.""a0
("Cable Act") provides in pertinent part: "A cable operator of a cable system
with more than 12 useable activated channels .hall carry the signals of local
commercial televisions stations, up to one-hird of the aggregate number of
useable activated channels of such system." Id. § 5 of the Cable Act provides in
pertinent part: "For purposes of this section, the term "local commercial
television station" means any full power television broadcast station, other than a

qualified noncommercial educational television station...." Id.
'o2Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 629.
'04
Id. at 633-34.
'04 . at 634, 659.
'0

Id. at 632-34.
'06 Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1192 (1997).
107 Id. at 1190.
' 4 Turner I, 512U.S. 622, 634.
4

'o

Arkansas Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
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The case went to the Supreme Court twice: Turner 1, " which I
just described and Turner Broadcasting v. FCC [hereinafter
"Turner IT]."' Lawyers built wings on their houses in Turner I
and Turner II. It really annoyed me because I was the only lawyer
not building a wing on the house because of these cases. The case
went to the Supreme Court twice, and in Turner II, Kennedy writes
the opinion again." 2 He is becoming increasingly influential as the
leading First Amendment Justice on the Court. He writes an
opinion that says cable broadcasters should be treated like full First
Amendment people." 3 The two sides argued analogies. The cable
broadcasters said, "We are just like newspapers."" 4 Over-the-air
broadcasters said, "No, they are really just like us, over-the-air
broadcasters. Therefore, they should be regulated because of
spectrum scarcity."" 5
The Court refused to accept both extreme analogies. It said,
ordinarily and for most things, cable broadcasters should have the
same First Amendment rights as a newspaper." ' The government
should not be able to regulate the cable industry by imposing
restrictions on what they can say." 7 But, they said, the cable
broadcasters, in one very important sense, are gatekeepers." 8 They
have gatekeeper power over what Americans will see. "' And that
gatekeeper power is so important that it can be regulated." :
Congress can step in when there is a danger that the gatekeeper
power is going to be abused and as long the regulation is not
content-based, as long as what Congress is saying to the cable
industry is not trying to regulate them on the basis of content, then
110Turner 1,'512 U.S. 622.
"'.

IP].
112

Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) [hereinafter "Turner

id.

' Id. at 1183-1202.
Turner1, 512 U.S. 622, 656.

114

115 Id.
116 Turner ll,
117

117 S. Ct. 1174, 1186.

Id.

"8 Id.at 1190.
"9 Id. at 1190.
120 Id.at 1187-1203.
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it is a perfectly legitimate regulation.' 2' Congress may regulate as
long as it builds an important record showing that it is necessary. M
Now, of course, as Judge Pratt has pointed out, knowing when
something is content-based and knowing when it is not contentbased is not easy. Four members of the court were convinced in
Turner 11 that this was content-based regulation saying, "If you
have to carry a particular kind of signal, that looks like it is contentbased to me."'2 Five members of the court said, "Nonsense, that
is not content-based because the content of over the air and the
content of cable are really indistinguishable, so it is not as though
we are really singling out the media with a unique content and
treating it differently." 124 So the difficulty of deciding what contentbased is, is right there, but the key is a recognition of shared First
Amendment interests.
Look at the various people in this situation who had First
Amendment hats. The cable broadcasters claiming that they were
the First Amendment beneficiaries, the over-the-air broadcasters
claiming that they were the First Amendment beneficiaries, the
audience claiming that it was the First Amendment beneficiary, and
Congress claiming that it was exercising some sort of First
Amendment concern by regulating the structural nature of the

communications industry. Once again the court could not choose
and did not choose. It comes out with a hybrid of trying to mix and
match the First Amendment interest in each.'
4 which is equally
The last case is Denver Area Broadcasting,"
complex. Denver Area Broadcasting deals with two things: first,
that there will be "public access" channels on your cable,'2 and
second, that those channels can be available for ordinary public

121

Id.

I= Id. at 1203.
'z' Id. at 1205-1218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (oined by Justices Scalia,

Thomas,
and Ginsburg).
12 4 Id. at 1189-1203.
125id.

" Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications
Communications Comm'n, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
'21Id. at 734.
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broadcasting.'2 I should say as a matter of policy, that it is the
least used resource in the United States now. Huge amounts of
communication potential are tied up in these public access channels,
most of which broadcast material that nobody wants to see. That is
an asset that reformers are going to look at very carefully in the
years to come because it is a potential asset that is monumentally
under-utilized in every community. This asset has a chance to be a
very important one because it is four or five channels on every
cable system.
The Court upheld the notion of that type of public access,
essentially saying that cable broadcasters could be viewed as
speakers for some things and conduits for other things." In other
words, they could be forced to set up this large portion of their
property over which they would have essentially no viable control.
Efforts to censor would be looked on by the courts with a great deal
of hostility.' 3° They would treat the public access channels as
though they were genuine speakers and give them speaker power to
decide what they would carry and efforts to control them would be
declared unconstitutional. "I
Secondly, in terms of the leased access channels, the channels that
broadcast soft por at night, the channels that somebody can just
come on and buy time, the question is, who is the speaker there? 1
Is it the cable broadcaster whose facilities are being leased? Is it
the lessor who has purchased the time? Is it the audience? How do
we work out the First Amendment calculus?
The particular regulation was one that said that anybody who
wants to receive the soft porn material over the leased access
channels has to ask for it. 3 You have to write to the station,
preferably you have to obtain a countersignature by your wife, and
say, "I would like this material broadcast into my home." And of
course the station said, "We'll keep that, you know, confidential.
No one will know. Absolutely confidential." And the question
128 Id.
'29Id.

at 760-66.

130 Id.
131
32

1

133

Id.
at 736.
Id. at 735, 754.
/d.
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was, is that constitutional? ' Does it violate the First Amendment
to set up a system whereby cable broadcasters are able to say this is
what we want?'" We do not want to broadcast this into anybody's
house that does not want it. We want them to tell us they want it
before it can go.
What the Supreme Court did, surprisingly, was to strike down the
regulation.3 They said, of course, that this is a complicated mix of
what interests can be adequately satisfied by allowing anybody who
does not want the offensive channels to contact the cable station and
say block it.'13 So there has to be a blocking mechanism in place.'
But it is an opt-out system, not an opt-in system. I
The Court held on First Amendment grounds.'0 Again, that is an
example of attempting, in a complex situation with lots of First
Amendment participants, to forge a First Amendment doctrine that
tries to give the most protection to everybody. If I had one lesson
to suggest to you, I think that it is the voice of the future talking to
us. I think the single issue easy First Amendment case will still
occur. But, those days ended with the flag burning case.'" That
was the cycle that told us what to do with the easy cases. The hard
cases that are going to come up in the future, in the years to come,
are cases in which more than one person plausibly seeks access to
speak. It is going to mean that in election cases, in media
regulation cases, sometimes in cases involving schools, we are
going to see an increasingly mixed First Amendment doctrine in an
effort to do justice to all the participants.

134

Id. at 754-60.

135Id.
1

3 Id.

137 Id.

138
id.

Id.
"4 Id. at 760, 768.
139

141Texas

v. Jobnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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